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Epigraph
After searching for an interesting TFC, Cobre las Cruces in conjunction with Eneo 
Tecnologia, gave us a chance to develop a project in the field of security in wireless 
environments.
Cobre Las Cruces is a renowned copper mining company located in Sevilla, with 
unexpected problems in wireless communications that have a direct affectation in 
production.  Therefore,  the  main  goals  are  to  improve  the  WiFi  infrastructure,  to 
secure it and to detect and prevent from attacks and from the installation of rogue 
(and non-authorized) APs. All of that integrated with the current ICT infrastructure.
This project has been divided into four phases, although only two of them have been 
included into the TFC; they are the analysis of the current situation and the design of 
a WLAN solution.
Once the  analysis  part  was finished,  some weaknesses were detected.  Subjects 
such as lack of connectivity and control, ignorance about installed WiFi devices and 
their localization and state and, by and large, the use of weak security mechanisms 
were some of the problems found. Additionally, due to the fact that the working area 
became larger and new WiFi infrastructures were added, the first phase took more 
time than expected.
As a result of the detailed analysis, some goals were defined to solve and it was 
designed  a  centralized  approach  able  to  cope  with  them.  A  solution  based  on 
802.11i and 802.1x protocols, digital certificates, a probe system running as IDS/IPS 
and  ligthweight  APs  in  conjunction  with  a  Wireless  LAN Controller  are  the  main 
features.
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1. Environment where this TFC happens
1.1. About CLC
Las Cruces is an open pit mining operation and process plant located in the Sevilla 
Province of  Southern  Spain  that  uses leaching and electrowinning technology to 
produce  copper  cathode.  It  is  owned  and  operated  by  Inmet  Mining,  who  is  a 
Canadian-based global  mining company that  produces copper  and zinc and also 
owns  and  operates  other  mining  operations  in  Turkey  and  Finland.  Inmet  also 
develops another project in Panama.
Cobre Las Cruces's plant is designed to produce approximately 72,000 tonnes of 
copper cathode per year which is shipped as final product. Inmet Mining has a 100 
percent interest in Las Cruces. Additional information is shown in tables 1 and 2.
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Targets and results
1.2. Technological field
Cobre las Cruces is a company with some special technological requeriments due to 
its specific business activity (copper mining and cathode production).
By the number of users it can be considered a large size company, but it also has an 
important  industrial  infrastructure working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,  where 
SCADA systems are a critical element. For this reason, communications with these 
systems are necessary to be up and running continuously and in an efficient way.
Systems infrastructure is mainly Microsoft based, with several corporate applications 
(i. e. ERP, Knowledge management, messaging and antivirus), a Windows Domain 
and several custom developed web applications. Otherwise, several Linux devices 
are  being  used  in  perimetral  security  and  to  allocate  several  of  the  new  high 
demanding  web  applications.  At  this  moment,  IT  department  is  moving  from  a 
physical server infrastructure to a virtualized and more redundant one.
With regard to the communications, it is a switched network, that has improved its 
performance and stability by the use of VLAN's and whose security has increased by 
the  use of  advanced firewalling and contents  inspection  technologies.  It  contains 
hundreds  of  wired  and  wireless  devices  and  there  are  some  wireless  areas  of 
influence. Moreover, VoIP technology is also fully integrated within this infrastructure.
Compared to other areas that are quite advanced, wireless part is certainly one of 
the “weaknesses”. After this project, the goal is to improve the wireless field so the IT 
department  can  have  a  global  an  accurate  knowledge  and  control  over  all  the 
wireless devices installed and can be notified as soon as something not allowed or 
just a change tries to be introduced in 2.4GHz frequency band.
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Cobre las Cruces has security in mind for all the areas of its business, so IT Security 
is growing in importance daily. This is why some of the infrastructures developed in 
this project will be used with other systems (i. e. PKI and digital certificates for e-mail 
digital signature). Eventually, the main goal of all the securization process (not only 
this  project)  is to  get  a  highly secure and redundant  infrastructure  with  a central 
management  point  (i.  e.  events/alarms  correlation,  access  control,  policies 
deployment,  vulnerabilities  detection,  IDS/IPS,  etc.);  therefore,  solutions 
implemented  in  this  project  will  be  fully  integrated  with  the  Active  Directory 
infrastructure and other architectures already installed or in progress.
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2. Goals
2.1. Object and scope
The  object  of  this  project  is  to  secure  the  wireless  network  infrastructure  of  an 
international mining company (Inmet Mining) with a subsidiary in Sevilla (Cobre las 
Cruces). Using Open Source software, it will include the analysis of the situation, the 
design, the implementation and a final evaluation of a solution based on 802.11i and 
802.1x protocols  and digital  certificates,  fully integrated with  Active Directory and 
Icinga. Also, the implementation of a PKI and the deployment of a rogue AP's and 
attacks detection system with a centralized management.
According to that, the scope of the TFC will vary depending on the results of the first  
phase of the project: The analysis of the situation. Due to the duration of the full  
project and the duration of the TFC, this is why the TFC is intended to be a part of  
the full project.
The  first  aim  was  to  include  three  of  four  parts  (analysis,  design  and 
implementation).  But  eventually,  only  analysis  and design phases were included. 
Actually, the initial idea was to include only the hidrometalurgic area (the production 
factory itself  and the headquarters), but the customer requested us to add all the  
wireless  communications  of  the  company  (Cobre  Las  Cruces),  including  all  the 
mining area and other contractors in that area, so the total area of research became 
much larger. This included not only more devices and networks to identify, but to  
work  on  a  solution  to  improve  wireless  communications  with  SCADA  systems 
(telecontrol network) and CCTV IP systems, that are suffering similar problems as 
the devices located in the factory and in the headquarters area.
2.2. Professional and personal goals
This section explains the goals of this project from a professional and personal point 
of view. Both perspectives are connected due to the special situation of this project.
It  is an initial  six months long project in an important company. Also, this project  
obtained an scholarship and it is intended to be an opportunity for me to improve my 
professional career and to focus on IT security. Whereas, it will be the better way to 
put in practice many of the concepts learnt in ETIS and to elaborate a good TFC (not 
just to pass this subject). After finishing ETIS, I would like to continue working on IT  
Security and studying postgraduated courses in the same field, so this project I think 
that  can  be  a  good  chance  for  me  as  an  entry  letter  and  for  improving  my 
professional career.
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With aproximately 1000 workers, several network technologies an about 10 wireless 
areas  of  influence,  the  main  goal  is  to  homogenize  that  infrastructure  and  to 
implement  a  solution  to  get  a  centralized  management  of  the  network  and  its 
security. Initially, based on Open Source software.
The  aim  is  to  solve  some  problems  of  the  customer:  lack  of  connectivity, 
interferences  between  WiFi  devices  (APs,  SCADA  systems...),  an  excessive 
incidence  response  time  and  an  important  unknowledge  about  installed  wireless 
devices, their localization and state. All of those problems have a direct affectation in 
production and their solution is a priority for CLC.
Also, another goals are the securization of the wireless network, the reduction of the 
attacks  and  the  detection  and  prevention  from  installing  rogue  AP's.  All  of  that 
integrated with the already created ICT infrastructure.
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3. Approach and methodology
As stated in the previous section, this TFC is expected to be a part of a 6 months  
project in the form of a practical case of consulting in WiFi and mainly in Security  
fields. So we will differentiate between a main project for a customer and another  
project (contained into the first one) for the academic part; it is, the wellknown TFC.
The approach for the project is to divide it into 4 parts: the previous analysis, the 
design of  a solution,  the implementation of  that  solution and a final  performance 
evaluation. Nonetheless, only the analysis and the design will form the TFC.
The methodology is to divide each main part into tasks and subtasks in order to 
make work easier to handle and able to plan it. With regard to the design stage, it  
shows an overall picture first and next a detailed explanation of each subpart within 
the global solution. In fact, the design will be a recursive task because is has been 
decided with the customer to do for each part separately. Then, until one part is not 
designed, approved by the customer and fully installed, the design of the next part 
does not start.
3.1. Tasks that form the project
This is the list of tasks under the two first phases of the project:
• Introduction
◦ Introduction to the customer of the global idea of this project and some of  
the technologies in use.
• Analysis of customer's current situation
◦ Knowledge of network topology and IT infrastructure.
◦ Study of the signal levels detected on each working centre.
◦ Inventory  and  tracking  down  of  AP's  and  SSID's  (updated  with  the 
inclussion  of  the  new  WiFi  influence  areas  and  the  new  technologies 
involved).
◦ Updating of  the information collected comparing it  with a previous work 
done by several Engineering companies several months ago.
◦ Wireless network assessment:
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▪ To gain access.
▪ To obtain configurations and to analyze them
▪ To find threats that can affect CLC's network security
◦ Writing conclusions.
◦ Evaluation  of  detected  problems  and  improvements  to  deal  with  and 
presentation of the report.
• Design of a solution based on customer's real requirements:
◦ Research  about  best  technologies  to  solve  issues  mentioned  in  the 
analysis stage (i. e. cipher features).
◦ Study of the technical specifications of the current networking devices in 
order to evaluate whether they can be used/adapted or not to  the new 
solution.
◦ Evaluation of the new devices required to purchase.
◦ Study of PKI requirements and viability of its implementation
◦ Writing of a report and presentation to the customer's CIO.
◦ Modification  (if  necessary)  to  the  previous  design  to  include  changes 
and/or requests made by the customer.
◦ Acceptance of the approach by the CIO of CLC.
So far, for the implementation and evaluation parts there are no tasks defined due to  
the fact that we are currently waiting for the acceptance of the global project and 
several main parts. Then, implementation will have to be decided with the customer. 
Nonetheless, this is an approach of the general tasks to do in the implementation 
and performance evaluation phases:
• Implementation of the solution. Some of the expected tasks will be:
◦ AP's standardization.
◦ Define base line for the migration in order to avoid that users loss network 
connectivity
◦ Implementation  of  a  network  authentication  solution  based  on  802.1x 
protocol over 802.11i standard. Some tasks are:
▪ Implementing RADIUS for authentication, autorization and accounting 
over a virtualized environment.
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▪ RADIUS integration with Active Directory infrastructure.
▪ Deployment of PKI.
▪ Migration to 802.11i solution (i. e. WPA2).
◦ Use of separated areas for users and guests
◦ Monitoring of new WiFi infrastructure
▪ Icinga monitoring system integration.
◦ Rogue AP's and attacks detection
▪ Deployment  of  detectors  in  strategic  positions  over  the  customer's 
buildings and dependences.
• Evaluation of the performance
◦ Execution of specific security and performance tests.
◦ Data collecting.
◦ Analysis of lacks and possible improvements
◦ Making a report and delivering it to the customer
3.2. Requirements
Apart from the supervision of the TFC and the support offered by Carlos Ares (UOC 
Consultant), this project is supervised by the IT Director (CIO) of Cobre las Cruces 
and by the Development area Director of Eneo Tecnología, Pablo Nebrero, who is 
also the teacher of de US (Universidad de Sevilla) in charge of mentoring (together 
with  Carlos  Ares)  this  project.  Furthermore,  several  ICT  professionals  of  Eneo 
Tecnología will give their support in some parts of the implementation of this project.
It is important to mention that staff designated by the customer has been required to 
attend  us  during the  access  to  the  mining  area and  security  clothes  have been 
necessary too.
At the end, some users of Cobre las Cruces will be required during implementation 
and testing phases of the solution.
With regard to the technical requirements, several laptops, WiFi adapters with (omni) 
directional antennas and a signal amplifier have been necessary during the analysis 
phase.  Additionally,  software to  study WiFi  signal  was required too  (i.  e.  to  view 
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amplitude time variations) and to capture and analyze paquets in all of the channels 
of  the  2.4GHz band  (i.  e.  to  detect  hidden  ESSID's  or  unexpected behaviour  of 
stations or AP's). For the wireless assessment (basic penetration testing), a set of 
tools will be used (like all  the included in BackTrack and WiFiWay Linux distros). 
Furthermore, several virtual machines will be necessary to install RADIUS and CA 
and  some  wireless  and  wired  networking  devices  will  be  required  too  (i.  e. 
Lightweight APs, a Wireless LAN Controller, some probe devices and switches).
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4. Planning
A first attempt of getting a planning is based on the four phases that the project is  
divided into:
1. Analysis
2. Design
3. Implementation
4. Performance test
Initially, the purpose was to link every phase of the project with a delivery of the TFC.  
So,  CA 2 (11/04/2011) would coincide with the presentation of  the results of  the 
analysis, CA 3 (02/05/11) with the design of the solution and CA 4 with a part of the 
implementation.  Otherwise, we found an important  unknowledge about  the global 
wireless  network  infrastructure  by  the  customer  so  it  was difficult  to  establish  a 
timming or schedule every subtask, mostly because the research task was greater 
than the initial  idea (in environmental  conditions quite different  that  those we are 
used to). In that way, the project has suffered some time variations, so eventually, 
the planning has been this:
• CA 1 (18/03/2011) → planning and state-of-the-art
• CA 2 (24/04/2011) → first part of the analysis phase
• CA 3 (19/05/2011) → second part of  the analysis phase, updated with the 
WiFi network assessment and additional conclusions
• CA 4 (06/06/2011) → overall picture of the design phase
 
Depending  on  the  acceptance  of  the  proposed  solution  by  CLC's  CIO,  the 
implementation  of  two of  the parts that  make up the solution (WiFi  Network and 
Probe system IDS/IPS) would start  on July. Consequently, the rest of  the project 
(implementation and performance evaluation) is out of the scope of the TFC, due to 
a timing reason.
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5. Next chapters
This  document  contains  two  additional  chapters:  one  for  the  analysis  part  and 
another for the design of the solution.
In the analysis section, they are shown the results of an intensive signal study, an 
SSIDs detection process and their tracking down and a later inventory of all the main 
WiFi  devices. Also, a wireless network assessment was done and the results are 
showed in the analysis part too. Eventually, all that gathered data was studied and 
the last part of this section suggests a set of conclusions to take into consideration  
about  the  wireless  network  infrastructure  of  the  customer  and  mostly  about  its 
weackness.
The design part is the result of the previous study of the situation. In fact, some goals 
were defined in conjunction with the customer so it is shown a design to achieve all 
those goals.  Initially,  it  is  given an overall  picture of  the approach and later  it  is  
divided into some parts so that a more detailed explanation can be done of each 
one. Additionally, benefits of this solution are exposed too.
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 22
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
Chapter 2 – Analysis of CLC's current 
situation
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1. Introduction to the analysis part
The goal of this section is to show the contents of the first phase of the four that 
form this project; it is, the analysis of the customer's current situation. Obviously, 
from  a  technical  point  of  view  and  always  focused  on  the  wireless  network 
infrastructure.
First of all, the tasks done up to now are introduced and explained in a brief way in 
order to concentrate in the conclusions. Additionally, the parts that make up this 
document are explained. It is important to mention that this document structure 
(with regard to the different sections used) is the same that the structure used for 
the report that was delivered to the customer, despite of the fact that customer's 
document was more extensive and it included confidential information that is not 
allowed to be shown in this document.
Also, the different sections explained here are used to show a sample of the results 
of  the  different  tasks  done  (i.  e.  WiFi  signal  sampling  and  WiFi  network 
assessment).
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 24
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
2. Tasks of the analysis part
This section lists the main tasks that make up the analysis of CLC's WiFi network 
current situation. All of those tasks have been done over most of the time we have 
been in the customer's facilities.
As  a  result,  this  document  offers  the  final  version  of  a  two  parts  document 
delivered in CA 2 and CA 3 and shows the analysis stage done. Next, these are the 
tasks:
◦ Knowledge of  network topology and IT  infrastructure.   Apart  from a first 
introduction done at the beginning of this project, a deeper knowledge has 
been adquired during the daily work, by the achievement of the defined 
tasks and goals within the analysis phase. However, additional knowledge 
has been obtained during the design stage.
◦ Study of  the signal  levels.   Sampling was taken in  all  the sites  where 
there could be computers or other mobile devices with WiFi capabilities.
◦ Tracking down and inventory of  the SSIDs and the main WiFi  devices.   
Tracking down of the SSIDs has been fully accomplished (updated with 
the  inclussion  of  new  WiFi  influence  areas  and  the  new  technologies 
involved) and main WiFi devices (AP's, printers, Point to Point bridges...) 
have been found. Only a few devices situated in not allowed places (i. e. in  
operational zones) or whose access requires an special permission and 
equipment (i. e. work on heights) are still pending. Remaining information 
from another contractor was obtained.
◦ Updating of the information collected comparing it with previous works   
done  by  several  Engineering  companies. Customer  gave  us  that 
information but there were few things to update due to the fact that the 
information  contained  in  those  reports  was  too  different  (perhaps 
outdated) from the current infrastructure. An appointment with technical 
managers of Ping Sistemas and ACT was eventually celebrated to collect 
extra information.
◦ Wireless  network  assessment.   Based  on  SSIDs  to  evaluate,  basic 
penetration tests were done. Within this task, the main goals were:
▪ To find vulnerabilities that could allow to gain access to that network or 
WiFi  device  (i.  e.  nonsecure  passwords  or  passphrases,  vulnerable 
protocols in use, etc.).
▪ To obtain configurations.
▪ To detect threats that can affect CLC's network security.
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◦ Writing conclusions.   Based on the previous tasks and on the study of all 
the collected information, a thorough approach will be given.
◦ Evaluation of the detected problems and improvements to deal with and   
presentation of the report. Once the report was finished, it was delivered 
to CLC's CIO. In fact, a detailed document and a presentation was made 
to several people to show them the results of this phase and to decide 
the goals on the design phase.
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3. Study of the signal levels
In this section, it is studied the use of the channels contained in 2.4 Ghz frequency 
range by the wireless networks detected in Cobre las Cruces.
It has been used a computer running as a probe device located in strategic points 
in every site. In this way, it was possible to offer a very accurate view of signal 
level received by stations (i. e. PC's).
In order to accomplish it, several hardware and software tools have been required:
• Software:
◦ inSSIDer 2
◦ WiFi Analyzer (for android)
◦ Ubuntu Linux 10.10 virtual machine
• Hardware:
◦ External (usb) WiFi device: Edimax EW-7318USg
◦ Omnidirectionnal 4dbi's antenna
◦ WiFi amplifier (500 mW): Renasis BA24J
Using an usb WiFi  device and a wireless signal amplifier,  the main purpose is to 
show signal levels that almost every station would receive in most cases. Moreover, 
it is intended to compare it with the exceptional signal levels (amplified) that just a 
few WiFi  devices would receive. In that case, they would be devices with a high 
power WiFi adapter (not very common). This comparison results highly important in 
places  where  different  SSIDs  could  be  detected  in  order  to  prevent  channel 
overlapping.
It  is important to take into account that this part of  the study only deals with non 
hidden  SSIDs.  So  it  reflects  the  same  as  a  computer  would  show in  its  list  of 
available WiFi networks. Hidden networks and their effects are studied in the next 
section (“Tracking down and inventory of the SSIDs and the main WiFi devices”).
Sampling has been done in 22 sites and depending on physical distribution and the 
presence of machines that could cause interferences, additional strategic points for 
sampling have been defined within every site. In this way, a total  of  40 points of 
sampling have been set.
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Table 3. The 21 most relevant places sampled and the main SSIDs detected
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As seen in the table 3, 21 of 22 sites where showed. The office placed in av. El 
Garrobo is located in a village called Gerena and although it was sampled, it is not 
expected to there be people working so wireless received signal is less important. In  
fact, that sampling was just a request done by the customer. Obviously, it has no 
sense to  compare SSIDs detected there to  those detected in the hidrometalurgic 
plant, which actually are more important.
With  regard  to  the  use  or  not  of  a  signal  amplifier,  it  is  important  to  take  into 
consideration that this device was physically broken after some sampling. Therefore,  
only some sites got both measures. It was not possible to repair it or to buy a new 
one. One option could have been to delete measures using the amplifier,  but we 
considered interesting enough to  keep them in  order to  show differences among 
those  places.  Moreover,  we talked  about  this  subject  with  the  customer  and  he 
considered it interesting enough to keep those measures as extra information.
Another subject to think about is that there were suspicious differences from using 
amplifier  or  not.  Actually,  there  were  places  where  signal  of  several  SSIDs  was 
detected in normal mode but not using the signal amplifier. The most common would 
have  been  to  get  much  better  signal  power  using  the  amplifier.  But  there  were 
several AP's with such an unstable signal (i. e. “clc_mo_doca” SSID) so signal cuts 
were frequent (with or without amplifier).
Every sampling (with and without signal amplifier), has been done for 30 minutes, 
although  the  software  only  shows  graphs  of  10  minutes  long.  Over  this  time, 
information  about  SSID,  signal  power,  channel,  AP's  MAC address  and  vendor, 
security, etc. is showed. Illustration 2 shows a sample of this output.
Also,  graphs  about  SSIDs  detected  on  every  channel  (table  3)  and  signal  time 
variation  (table  4)  have  been  created  to  show  channel  coincidences  between 
different SSIDs and how link quality can vary over the time due to several reasons; it  
is, to show signal behaviour across time.
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Due to  the  frequent  signal  cuts  and  the  unexpected  signal  behaviour  of  several 
SSIDs,  many  sampling  have  been  done.  As  a  result,  165  graphs  have  been 
generated for the customer's report to satisfy the needs of this part of the study. In 
every site section, an explanation about the obtained results has been given.
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Illustration 3. SSIDs detected per channel in the contractors' area (hut of Inselma)
Illustration 4. Signal variations across time in the contractors' area (hut of Inselma)
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4. Tracking down and inventory of the SSIDs and the 
main WiFi devices
This section is divided into two subsections. The first one belongs to the task of 
SSIDs detection and the second to the tracking down of the signal source(s) and its 
corresponding inventory.
The main goal of this task is to detect any WiFi device acting as an AP or signal 
transmitter source in the area requested by the customer. Regardless it is a device 
running as a bridge or anything else with a WiFi adapter, a device owned by CLC or 
by a contractor, it is important to detect them to prevent wireless infrastructure 
from attacks, channel overlapping, interferences,  unnecessary or malfunctioning 
devices and to detect lacks and limited WiFi coverage.
4.1. SSIDs detection
Unlike the previous section (study of the signal levels), which was done based on a 
per site sampling, SSIDs detection has been done based on a per area sampling. In 
this case, each sampling has taken between 1 and 3 hours long and the probe 
laptop  has  been placed  in  several  points  within  each area  to  detect  as  many 
different  SSIDs as  possible.  It  has not  been an static  sampling,  but  in  motion. 
Illustration 5 shows the area covered with this task.
To accomplish this part, these software and hardware tools have been used:
• Software:
◦ WiFiway 2.0.1 operating system
◦ Airmon-ng and airodump-ng
• Hardware:
◦ Sony  Vaio  laptop  with  integrated  WiFi  adapter  (based  on  chipset  Intel 
2200bg)
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Capturing any WiFi packet, it was possible to get hidden and non hidden SSIDs and 
to extend results from the previous section. Consequently, at the end of this task, 6 
main areas (25 subareas) have been sampled and 25 different SSIDs have been 
detected. 19 of them are non hidden SSIDs and 6 hidden. 5 of these 6 SSIDs have 
been discovered by the use of advanced packet capturing and analysis tools. Table 
4 lists the result of the 25 detected SSIDs.
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 32
Illustration 5. Area covered with SSIDs detection
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It  is  important  to  mention  that  this  task has been done over  several  weeks and 
sampling on the same areas have been repeated several times in order to get the  
most accurate and up-to-date information. However, most of the changes in wireless 
network infrastructure were done without notice and still they are being made. So, 
there  may  be  new  SSIDs  or  WiFi  devices  not  showed  in  this  study.  Currently,  
customer is conscious about this fact.
Compared to the signal study, several extra non hidden SSIDs have been detected 
in the same places. The main reason is that capturing of packets is different from 
signal study. The first one captures whatever it is detected, even a beacon every few 
minutes, while the second one studies signal based on other parameters and has 
other requirements (i. e. to receive a mininum number of packets per second), so it 
dismiss SSIDs because it is not able to get enough information in a regular basis to  
analyse those signals and to consider them valid networks.
Previous SSIDs list will be useful to set a baseline for next task: Tracking down and 
inventory of the main WiFi devices.
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Table 4. List of detected SSIDs, their operational channels and MAC
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4.2. Tracking down and inventory of the main WiFi 
devices
With  the information gathered in the previous section,  tracking down of  the main 
WiFi  devices was done across  the  study areas.  Also,  it  has  been important  the 
documentation collected from other networking Engineering companies (i.  e. ACT 
and  Ping  Sistemas)  that  installed  some  WiFi  infrastructures  and  from  several 
departments of CLC that manage their own wireless network environment. 
Some devices have been located visually during this task, but other devices have 
needed a more intensive tracking down. In fact, in some cases, special access has 
been required and even, some devices are still pending of inventory due to their 
inaccessibility.  In  a  short  time,  it  is  expected  to  solve  this  subject  with  the 
customer for pending devices.
To accomplish this part, these software and hardware tools have been used:
• Software:
◦ WiFiway 2.0.1 operating system
◦ Airmon-ng and airodump-ng
• Hardware:
◦ Sony Vaio laptop
◦ External (usb) WiFi device: Edimax EW-7318USg
◦ Directional 19 dbi antenna
◦ Camera
As part of the inventory, local access to the device has been preferred whenever it 
has been possible. If not, remote access has been the alternative. However, there 
are a few located wireless devices for critical systems (i. e. SCADA and industrial 
electronic control systems) connected to independent networks whose access is 
restricted. So information will be provided by their engineers. 
Once located the device itself, this is the obtained information:
• Vendor
• Model
• Serial Number
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• MAC address of wireless interface
• MAC address of wired interface (if it exists)
• Management IP (if possible)
• SSID
• Location
• Owner (i. e. CLC or a contractor)
• State (switched on/off)
Also, several photos have been taken to show its location and a better view of the 
device. Illustrations 6 to 8 are a sample of the photos taken to several devices.
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Illustration 6. Wireless devices used for  
security patrol
Illustration 7. Camera zoom: a Cisco AP and 
two directional antennas
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Illustration 8. Photos of one end of a wireless point to point link
42 relevant WiFi devices have been located. 8 of them are switched off and 
inaccessible and the customer has been properly noticed about it. It is important to 
say that attending to the SSIDs information, there are several wireless 
networks/devices outside CLC, so their tracking down has not been possible. It has 
been reported to the customer.
This section contains a per site inventory of those WiFi devices, showing only fields 
such as Vendor, model, serial number, MAC WLAN, MAC LAN, ESSID and IP LAN 
for each device.
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5. Wireless network assessment
This section deals with the results of the assessment done over the WiFi network 
infrastructure of Cobre Las Cruces.
The main goal on this work is to get an overall picture of the current infrastructure, 
mostly of the weaknesses from a point of view of ICT security, and to increase the 
knowledge obtained in previous sections within this analysis. For this reason, only 
a  few  basic  penetration  tests  have  been  done  and  the  configurations  of  the 
accessed WiFi devices have been checked.
Therefore, an intensive vulnerabilities assessment has not been done. In fact, once 
a vulnerability has been detected privileges scalation has not been tried or the 
attack of any critical system to take it over. Actually, this would be out of the scope 
of this project.
It is important to mention that tests that may involve any kind of denial of service 
have not been launched, so the detected vulnerabilities have not been exploited, 
althought exploits  for  those flaws are available over the Internet.  Also,  session 
hijacking and collecting of user personal information has been possible in several 
places in the infrastructure;  however,  just  a few samples have been caught to 
show that vulnerability. We consider not necessary to pick up a larger amount of 
personal/confidential information.
In order to accomplish it, several hardware and software tools have been required:
• Software:
◦ Ubuntu Linux 10.10 virtual machine
◦ BackTrack Linux 5 virtual machine
◦ Windows 7 virtual machine
◦ WiFiway 2.0.1 operating system
◦ Suite  of  tools  aircrack-ng  (airmon-ng,  airodump-ng,  aireplay-ng, 
packetforge-ng and aircrack-ng)
◦ Nmap
◦ Nessus
◦ Wireshark
◦ Cain & Abel
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• Hardware:
◦ Sony  Vaio  laptop  with  integrated  WiFi  adapter  (based  on  chipset  Intel 
2200bg)
◦ Asus F6V laptop with integrated WiFi adapter (based on chipset Intel WiFi 
Link 5100)
◦ External (usb) WiFi device: Edimax EW-7318USg
◦ Omnidirectionnal 4dbi's antenna
As  previously  mentioned,  several  techniques  have  been  used  to  perform  this 
assessment.  The  most  important  are  packet  sniffing, port  scanning,  banner 
grabing, arp spoofing/poisoning, Man in The Middle and social engineering among 
other.
It is important to mention that doing “ping” to a remote host (and obtaining the echo 
reply successfully)  is a good sample of  connectivity with that  host.  Nevertheless, 
ICMP traffic  may be blocked between two hosts.  Therefore,  to  get  a  connection 
against several ports (services) of a remote host is a better sign of access. Since that  
moment, to find out whether services are vulnerable can be checked.
With this assessment, it has been intended to detect several items:
• Use of  vulnerable WiFi  devices,  regardless they are Point-to-Point  links or 
APs.
• Use of weak protocols and/or ciphering algorithms.
• Lack of confidentiality in wireless communications.
• Lack of access controls between hosts from different network segments.
• Low management of events and errors generated by WiFi devices.
• Use of outdated devices and/or configurations.
Apart from a penetration test, another task has been collecting configuration files 
of  WiFi  devices  in  order  to  analyze  them  and  to  create  a  backup  of  that 
information.
According to the scope defined with the customer, 7 SSIDs (and their associated 
devices) have been audited:
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 38
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
• “clc_mo_doca”
• “CORTA”
• “WiFi-contratistas”
• “SECTOR9”
• “3_4”
• “SECTOR8”
• “CLCPTA”
This document explains the results of 4 of them. These SSIDs are considered good 
representatives of the different types of wireless network infrastructures found in 
CLC.
5.1. “clc_mo_doca”
This SSID belongs to the IP cams' system installed on several control access points 
(el  Seroncillo  and  CLC's  wharehouse).  This  infrastructure  is  no  longer  in  use 
because it has been recently replaced by a new system.
In this case of study, the AP (located in the main control access area) was attacked 
to obtain the WEP key and to demonstrate the weak of WEP ciphering. Moreover 
the 64 bits choice (like in this case).
After WiFi sampling done in this area, several associated devices were found out. 
Then, we changed the MAC of our WNIC with one of those obtained in the sampling 
process in order to avoid possible MAC control access filtering and to improve the 
attack itself. The main goal was to obtain an ARP packet and to force reinjection of 
many  packets  per  second  in  order  to  get  a  large  amount  of  data  packets 
containing initialization vectors.
As a result, after getting approx. 21000 data packets it was possible to obtain the 
key. It took less than 30 minutes. Illustration 9 shows the result of this operation.
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5.2. “wifi-contratistas”
This SSID belongs to a Cisco AP that offers WiFi access to the users in contractors' 
area.  The main goal  on this  device is  to provide with Internet  access to those 
users.
In this case, several flaws were discovered. Notice that this is a hidden SSID so 
there are many people not able to configure this kind of network by themselves (a 
part from asking IT staff). Additionally, IP configuration of this device was old so it 
was necessary to change several things in the routers and switches to gain access 
to this AP without service interruption.
Once  we  got  access,  we  obtained  running  configuration  to  analyze  it.  Several 
issues  were  found  and  they  may  affect  the  common  problems  that  users  are 
experiencing to connect their computers and mobile devices to that network. For 
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instance, it was reduced to 20 mW the maximum power transmission for clients to 
connect to this AP.
This  network  uses  a  128  bits  key  to  offer  confidentiality.  In  this  case,  it  was 
preferred  to  work  on  social  engineering  to  obtain this  key.  Three people were 
asked and all of them gave us the passphrase (and even several extra keys for 
other  WiFi  networks  available  there).  This  shows  how  inefficient  is  the  use  of 
shared keys to protect communications.
Once we got associated, using packet sniffing, arp spoofing, arp poison and man-
in-the-middle techniques, it was possible to get confidential  data transmitted in 
clear text (as seen in Illustration 10).
With regard to the configuration of the device, it was detected that date and time 
values were incorrect.
Additionally,  the method to cipher IOS's passwords was Cisco's weak algorithm 
(“type  7”).  So  it  was  easy  to  obtain  the  password  in  clear  text  using  just  a 
webpage. This is one example of a line found in the configuration file:
username apconxxx privilege 15 password 7 113910xxxxxxxxxxxxx
In this  case,  in few minutes it  can be obtained the credentials  of an user with 
administrive permissions.
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Illustration 10. User data (POP3 e-mail) obtained
Illustration 11. Date and time of an AP located 
in the contractors' area
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5.3. “SECTOR9”
This SSID belongs to a Point-to-Point link located in the mine area.  This link is 
formed by two WiFi  devices that connect two ends (water probes of the water 
treatment system).
Initially, this network was inoperative so we get access to one of the devices and 
we got to audit  it.  This  assessment  was quite exhaustive because it  is  such a 
critical  infrastructure  that  the  customer  was  very  interested  in  knowing  any 
possible flaw.
Some bugs were discovered. Some of them were due to an insecure configuration 
by default and another due to an obsolete firmware.
Communications were protected by a 64 WEP passphrase. Using an attack based 
on the creation of a weird packet and its reinjection it was possible to obtain a 
large amount of data packets containing initialization vectors and eventually to get 
the key in just 20 minutes. Illustration 12 contains several command lines with the 
tools used and the result.
Once associated, without using a fake MAC address, it was launched a port scanner 
to detect open ports (result in table 5).
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Port  80 was  open and it  had an obsolete Apache web server  version.  Current 
version is 2.2.18 so there is no support for version 0.6.5 and there may be exploits 
for detected vulnerabilities over the Internet.
Connection  to  port  80  was  stablished  using  a  web  browser.  Credentials  were 
required but via Google (Illustration 13) it was possible to find the default user and 
password that were the valid credentials.
Once gained access, configuration was checked and it was discovered that:
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Illustration 13. A successful search in Google for the default user/pass
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• MAC-based control access was disabled, although engineers that installed 
this device stated several times that it was enabled.
• Default SNMP values for read/write communities (public and private) were in 
use.
• System log was not enable so it was possible to display only the last 17 
entries.
• This device had support for 64 and 128 bits WEP and WPA security, but just 
64 bits WEP was used. 802.1x protocol was supported too, but it was not 
used.
• System log refreshing had a bug that allowed to increase one second the 
time  of  every  log  entry  each time “Refresh”  button  was  clicked.  It  was 
demonstrated that an automated system could modify considerably the real 
time of an event.
Apart from these flaws,  a vulnerability test was launched and two medium risk 
vulnerabilities were detected in the web server:
• XXS (cross-site scripting) attack vulnerability.
• Cookie injection attack vulnerability.
It is important to mention that thanks to the work done up to now, it was possible 
to detect a not permitted access to several of the WiFi networks in the mine area. 
An station located in a contractor wharehouse was trying to get associated with 
this network. It was able to hack into other WiFi networks in the mine area with 
WEP security; therefore sampling done in previous sections has become a valuable 
proof of it. Currently, it is being investigated.
5.4. “CLCPTA”
This SSID belongs to a Cisco device running as AP in the headquarters. It offers 
WiFi access to the network and to Internet.
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This case has no security so it illustrates how easy it is to spy communications 
between computers  and to steal  personal/confidential  data without  any kind of 
warning or restriction.
Association with this SSID was immediate and using arp spoofing and man-in-the-
middle techniques with the aid of an sniffer it was possible to get sensible data. 
Initially, an arp scan was done to find all the hosts in that network segment. Then, 
with those previous techniques, several domain user credentials were obtained. It 
was possible to intercept netbios protocol  messages between a desktop and a 
development server:
Source MAC address      :  00:1C:23:1F:36:53 
Destination MAC address :  00:41:0A:31:72:A2 
Source IP address      : 172.29.1.23 
Destination IP address : 172.29.150.56 
                           <<domainxxx>> 
Protocol: TCP 
Source port: 1767   
Destination port: 445    microsoft-ds 
Transferred bytes: 22562 
Account: 
userxxx/userxxx:"":"":35E65C76AF4ACDB2000000000000000000000000000xxxxxx 
Additional Info: DOMAIN: <<domainxxx>>
Another important data obtained was domain user of the Managing Director and 
several websites and images visited by this “VIP user”. It was clear text captured 
due to HTTP access.
Several hosts in different VLANs were accessed. Some of them are IP cams of CLC 
and  contractors.  It  was  possible  to  connect  to  a  website  to  display  and  fully 
configure these IP cams. In the same network segment it was possible to launch a 
vulnerabilities test against a computer that manages access to CLC's facilities and 
two unpatched vulnerabilities were detected. Those bugs allow to execute remote 
code using SMB and RPC flaws.
Another network segment accessed was that where internal servers are located. A 
comprehensive network scan was done to discover the hosts and 9 critical servers 
were port scanned and their services fingerprinted. We considered not necessary 
to launch a vulnerabilities test against those computers in order to prevent any 
unwanted  behaviour  (i.  e.  DoS).  Anyway,  it  was  enough  to  show  how  that 
important network was accessible by anyone connected to “CLCPTA” non secure 
WiFi network.
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6. Conclusions of the analysis
This section contains a set of conclusions after the work done up to now and all the 
data gathered about CLC's wireless network infrastructure.
It is not intended to act as a guideline or as a set of solutions for the problems 
detected, but a summary of the current situation of the wireless infrastructure and 
the  main  issues  found  during  the  analysis  stage.  In  fact,  it  is  expected  that 
whoever  that  reads  this  document  (mainly  the  technical  people  from  the  IT 
department) should be able to get a global idea about the environment and its 
strengths but mainly about its weaknesses.
Notice that due to a confidentiality policy, there are information and conclusions 
that cannot be showed in this document.
6.1. Overall picture
Wireless network infrastructure of CLC can be divided into 5 main environments:
• Wireless point-to-point links:   used to link several areas or sites. There are 3 
operational networks and 1 of them is a backup system of a fiber point-to-
point  link.  Also,  there  is  one  additional  link  whose  devices  are  currently 
switched off. One of those links is a WAN backup, so it is important to get it 
always  up  and  ready  to  move  from  passive  to  active  link  whenever  it  is 
necessary.
• APs for  WiFi  networks:   used to  grant,  on  the  one hand,  access to  CLC's 
network only for CLC's users and, on the other hand, access to Internet for  
contractors. There are two devices running as APs. One in the headquarters 
and another in the contractors' area. Both WiFi networks are important but not 
critical.
• Telecontrol wireless network:   joined with a fiber based network, the WiFi part 
is  used  to  extend  that  network  range  due  to  the  fact  that  mine  area  is  
continuously getting larger. There are three WiFi links used by “SDR” system 
(system to manage water inside the mine). One link is currently switched off  
because it is a backup line between the mine and the production plant and the 
rest  should  be  working  to  close  the  ring  network  topology,  but  they  are 
currently inoperative because three of four WiFi devices are out of order. This 
is a critical network, mostly in case of the fiber line between the mine and the 
plant fails, because this system cannot be remotely managed.
• IP CCTV system:   there are two CCTV systems. One to control several places 
in  the  mine  area  and  another  system  to  control  customer  facilities  (i.  e.  
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access, headquarters, etc.). Most of the cams are connected to a separated 
fiber  network,  but  there  are  6  cams  (and  additional  cams  pending  of 
installation)  conected  through  WiFi  devices.  A  third  system  could  be 
considered, but there are not WiFi devices connected there. All of those cams 
(wired and wireless) are IP devices.
• Other  devices:   Printers  with  WiFi  adapter,  barcode  scanners  and  slide 
projectors.  Most  of  them  are  used/owned  by  contractors.  They  are  not 
monitored and usually installed according to temporary requirements.
Regarding to the detected problems, they are mainly due to 3 items:
• Unkwnoledge about what it is actually installed and working.
• Decentralized management of  the WiFi  infrastructures and just  focused on 
satisfying the temporary needs.
• Use of old technologies and configurations with a low security level.
6.2. Management
According to whom it manages each wireless network infrastructure we can made 
4 partitions:
• IT  department:   they only manage wireless point-to-point  links and APs for 
WiFi networks. In fact, they have not a full knowledge about devices used in 
those links. In case of wireless failure, they get in touch with Ping Sistemas,  
that  installed  those  communications  systems.  They  manage  incidences  of 
devices from Mining department too.
• Mining department:   they know about  the  existence of  several  cams in  the 
mine area that are connected to a WiFi network but nothing else. They are 
worried about one cam used to monitor periodic controlled mine blowing up 
whose signal  is  received by the  Chief  of  this  department.  The  full  system 
(cams  and  WiFi  infrastructure)  was  designed  and  deployed  by  Doca 
Eléctricos, but the system is currently managed by Ping Sistemas. Complaints 
have  increased  because  the  system  is  not  currently  working  and  signal 
interruptions are common. They report incidences to IT department.
• Water  treatment  department:   they  have  their  own  management  about 
telecontrol network and its devices. Nobody has technical knowledge about 
what and how has been installed (with regard to WiFi  devices). When they 
detect any problem that affects to the telecontrol network and the industrial 
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electronic control system, they get in touch with ACT, which is the company 
that installed and currently maintains all the system. Apart from several people 
of  this department  nobody from CLC knows about  how this system works. 
Network devices are not monitored.
• Security patrol:   they manage the set of cams with WiFi adapters. One part of 
the  system  was  designed  and  deployed  by  Doca  Eléctricos,  but  it  has 
common technical flaws. Ping Sistemas has updated this system and installed 
new devices. This is the company to whom they directly report when there are 
technical failures. People from security patrol have knowledge about most of 
the current working devices, but not about the wired or wireless connection 
and whether they are connected to one SSID or another.
Up to now there is no person with a wide knowledge about which devices and how 
they are installed now. Each department manages its own incidences and reports 
technical  issues to  its  contractor  and then gets a solution for  its problems in  an 
isolated  way.  Also,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  company  that  manages 
switching, routing and networking security (Eneo Tecnologia) only monitors a few 
devices (such as Point-to-Point  links and several  IP cams) of  those belonging to 
wireless networking.
There is no SLA defined with technological suppliers.
In  CLC,  technical  issues  are  carried  out  in  an  autonomous  way  by  several 
departments and mostly by companies different from CLC. Therefore, the customer 
has not an overall picture of his infrastructure and he relies on solutions given by 
other  companies.  In  case  of  failure,  how  can  someone  decide  about  subjects  
connected to CLC's WiFi  infrastructure knowing only the tip of  the iceberg? Who 
does control quality of the work done by those technological contractors?
6.3. Technical issues
As seen in other sections, there is no control over WiFi devices installed in CLC. It  
involves that several departments get in touch with their own suppliers in order to 
install  as many WiFi  devices as required in that moment.  And the same to solve 
problems. In the same way, unexpected WiFi devices can “appear” and “disappear” 
without knowing how their installation and uninstall can interfere over other critical  
wireless networks already running (i.  e.  channel  overlapping).  In fact,  there is no 
central management over installed WiFi  systems in CLC and it involves a lack of 
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coordination  and  prevention  from  technical  problems.  Moreover,  nobody  alerts  if  
someone install his/her own AP for a personal need.
Not important channel overlapping scenarios have been found, and situations where 
signal interferences could be something to have into account have been reported to 
the  department  responsible  person.  Also,  the  actions  taken  are  detailed  in  the 
document that was delivered to the customer. The next illustrations (from 14 to 16) 
show detected WiFi signals from different SSIDs in some parts of CLC's facilities.
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With regard to the WiFi AP installed in contractors' area, several incidences have 
been reported. In fact, that SSID is hidden as a security measure, signal power has 
been  reduced  to  avoid  interferences  with  other  wireless  devices  and  several 
parameters have been changed in the configuration to grant some control over that 
WiFi network. But users have problems to connect to that network, in some cases 
due to a coverage problem and in other cases due to the hidden SSID (users are not 
able  to  manually  configure  that  network  by  themselves).  Additionally,  it  has  an 
outdated IP configuration (as the network with SSID “CLCPTA”) that hinders us from 
accessing to the device management console.
It  has  been  detected  that  several  wireless  devices  (i.  e.  Cisco  and  D-Link 
APs/bridges) are switched off, whereas other point-to-point links are down waiting 
for  the  repair  of  one  or  both  end  devices.  In  the  same  way,  Doca  Eléctricos 
installed Ubiquiti WiFi devices and gave outdated information, so technicians from 
Ping  Sistemas  have  difficulties  to  access  and/or  to  properly  configure  those 
devices.  Those  devices  are  used  together  with  cams  that  currently  are 
experiencing connectivity problems.
In  the previous WiFi  assessment  section,  it  has been showed that  WiFi  network 
security has several threats. Next, there are a few examples:
• Ease for  communications spying and user  data  theft.   Every guest  or  user 
could pass oneself off as other person or to tap communications between two 
computers (i. e. using WiFi networks without confidentiality or WEP algorithms 
of 64 or 128 bits that are weak).
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Illustration 15. Number of SSIDs detected in 
CLC's wharehouse
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• Critical  vulnerabilities  detected  in  several  hosts.   Such  as  in  a  computer 
located in “Control de Seguridad”, with bugs solved by Microsoft several years 
ago but not patched yet.
• Unrestricted access to configuration and display of security patrol cams.  
• Low maintenance and updating of WiFi devices.   An example of it is the use of 
firmware  with  obsolete  components,  such  as  WiFi  devices  that  link  water 
treatment system in the mine area.
• Unrestricted access to other network segments for every user connected to a   
WiFi  network. It  has been demonstrated  accessing from the  WiFi  network 
situated in the headquarters to several subnetworks and getting information of  
their hosts.
• Use  of  insecure  configurations.   For  instance  using  default  passwords  to 
access to the management console of several devices.
• Repeating credentials to use and to configure different WiFi devices.   By and 
large,  each technological  supplier  has used the same credentials  for  each 
WiFi device he has installed. Those credentials have not been modified over 
the last years.
• Lack  of  WiFi  intrussion  detection  and  prevention  systems.   The  users  can 
attack WiFi security protocols (i. e. WEP) without generating any kind of event 
or alert. Furthermore, countermeasures are not done. The best example of it 
is just the fact of been able to accomplish all the tests done within the WiFi 
assessment using tools that everybody can dowload from Internet.
• Use of security policies based on hidding data.   For instance, the network with 
SSID “WiFi-contratistas”. Its SSID is hidden and the password is private, but 
everyday less  users  ask  for  permission  to  IT  department  to  connect  their 
laptop to that network. Using social Engineering it has been showed that users 
share publicly that key to everybody that “requires” it. Therefore, use of shared 
keys is not a good way to maintain communications confidentiality.
Regarding to security, it is important to mention that some Point-to-Point links are 
quite secure (using WPA2,  802.1x based authentication and hidden SSIDs).  This  
assures confidentiality in the communications. However, the configuration of these 
devices has not up to date password protection mechanisms or monitoring and event 
collecting systems. For instance, they use Cisco's ciphering algorithm to store IOS 
passwords (“type 7” identificated), which is weak, insted of MD5 hashes (“type 5” 
identified), that are not reversible.
And what about if a new WiFi device is installed without permission? What would be 
the  effects  of  an undetected rogue AP used to  gather  personal  information  from 
users or confidential information from CLC?
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At a sum, we consider that an heterogeneous wireless infrastructure may benefit in 
some cases, but in a corporate environment like this, it probably involves a higher 
response  time  in  case  of  failure,  security  threats,  a  lesser  knowledge  of  the 
inversion done and a problem of resources optimization.
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Chapter 3 - Design of a WLAN 
solution
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1. Introduction to the design part
The goal of this section is to show the contents of the second phase of the four 
that form this project; it is, the design of a Wireless LAN solution.
It  starts  with the main goals to be solved on this  approach.  Those items were 
collected during the interview with the customer where the results of the analysis 
stage were showed.
Once  defined  those  goals,  the  design  of  the  solution  is  showed.  Then,  the 
advantages of this design are listed and a summary of the parts that form this 
approach are given too.  In fact,  due to the design of such a complex solution, 
which embraces multiple technologies, it has been divided into several parts. This 
involves introducing the overall of the result (called “photo finish”) and later, the 
detail of each part.
This solution is given in a modular basis, so that each part is as autonomous as 
possible. It allows the customer to decide whether to accept a module or to change 
something else without affecting the rest. Therefore, once all the modules have 
been deployed all the pieces will fit together like a puzzle. Consequently, all the 
requirements (the goals) will be achieved and a highly secure WiFi environment 
will be guaranteed.
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2. Goals to achieve
This section enumerates the main goals aimed to be achieved by the design of this 
solution. They were defined once the stage of analysis was finished and the report 
with the results was delivered to the customer. In fact, they are the result of the 
weaknesses and lacks detected in the current wireless network infrastructure.
As  the  customer  stated,  several  of  these  goals  are  critical  due to  the  threats 
showed in the assessment of the WiFi infrastructures.
Next, these are the goals:
• To provide the corporate users with WiFi  access to CLC's network and to 
Internet.
• To  provide  the  contractors  and  the  guests  users  with  access  to  Internet 
through WiFi.
• To deploy WiFi area of influence across only these 7 working centres:
◦ Área de Gestión Documental
◦ Oficinas Generales
◦ Panel de Control
◦ Sala de Formación
◦ Taller Eléctrico
◦ Taller Mecánico
◦ Zona de Contratistas
• To create an user friendly infrastructure to connect to the WiFi network.
• To distinguish easily between corporate and non corporate users.
• To prevent all the wireless infrastructure from RF interferences and channel 
overlapping.
• To reuse as much as possible the already available WiFi devices.
• To grant  confidentiality  on the  channel  and environment  used to  transmit 
information, it is, the air.
• To unify security system across all the WiFi infrastructures currently available.
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• To maximize the control over all the WiFi infrastructures in order to prevent 
against  possible  attacks  and  intrussions  from  inside/outside  CLC's 
dependencies.
• To deploy a system to  detect  the  rogue APs/stations.  This  system should 
provide the tools to define the policies for the countermeasures against those 
malicious devices.
• To prevent against the installation of  non-authorized APs all  around CLC's 
dependencies.
• To provide the contractors with a solution useful enough so that they gently 
move from their own AP with Internet  access to the CLC's WiFi  corporate 
solution. It is imperative to withdraw those APs not owned by the customer.
• To update devices and their configurations as much as possible so that the 
previously detected flaws can be solved.
• To  establish  a  secure  and  automated  system  of  data  collecting  and 
maintenance for the configurations of all the WiFi devices.
• To integrate the solution with the current customer's ICT infrastructure.
• To design a highly scalable and modular solution according to the state-of-
the-art for this kind of systems.
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3. Overall picture
This section shows the design of a secure WLAN solution for Cobre Las Cruces.  
This is the overall image of the proposed design that, as previously stated, it neither 
offers an exhaustive perspective of each technology in use nor the infrastructures 
affected. It will be done in the next subsection.
This solution, as showed in illustration 17, aims to be a combination of several state  
of the art technologies and security standards. These are a sample:
• Technologies involved:  
◦ WiFi sensors running as IDS/IPS
◦ Multiple APs in a Lightweight AP – Wireless LAN Controller topology
◦ Multiple SSIDs to differentiate between different user profiles
◦ Digital certificates
◦ Multiple  WLANs  to  isolate  traffic  from/to  insecure  zones and to  restrict 
access to several segments of the corporate network
• Security standards and protocols in use:  
◦ 802.11i → WPA2 protocol
◦ 802.1x → RADIUS based authentication infrastructure
◦ EAP → authentication method
◦ AAA (authentication, authorization and accounting)
◦ LWAPP / CAWAP protocol to manage lightweight access points
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3.1. Explanation of the design
The proposed design deals with 5 different WiFi  infrastructures. Each one has its 
own particularities but all of them have been adapted to a global wireless solution. 
The main purpose is to offer an overall picture so that the customer is able to know 
which will be the result of this project. After that, in order to define how to arrive to 
this end, the design has been divided into some pieces and treated in a separated  
way. This allows to focus on each part in a more efficient way and to work on it as an 
autonomous item (eventually integrated with the rest).  The modifications  and the 
performance tests are preferred to accomplish in a more controlled infrastructure.
Apart from those WiFi infrastructures, there are additional technologies developed 
within this approach. Nonetheless, they will be showed as different modules (in the 
same way as the WiFi infrastructures). Therefore, it involves a total of 8 modules or 
“subprojects”. It is important to take into consideration that monitoring system is not 
an independent module because there is already a running system. So, integration 
into that system will be considered a part of each module.
Next, a brief explanation of each module:
• WiFi  Network:   this  part  will  consist  of  a  set  of  lightweight  APs  centrally 
managed  by  a  Cisco  Wireless  LAN  Controller.  Autonomous  APs  will  be 
upgraded  to  LAP mode.  WPA2  and  802.1x  will  be  used  in  order  to  gran 
confidentiality  in  the  communications  from  end-to-end.  EAP  will  be  the 
preferred authentication mode using digital  certificates.  Three global SSIDs 
will be created: one for corporate users validating their credentials against a 
Windows Domain Controller and two SSIDs for visitors. One of those two will 
be an OPEN and isolated network used by default to allow guests to fill in a  
form (through an automated redirection to  a local website) to  ask for  valid 
credentials to connect to the “official” guests WiFi network. Once a set of valid 
credentials are generated, the system updates a local database of credentials 
in  the  RADIUS Server  and guests  will  be  allowed to  connect  to  the  other 
SSID.
• WiFi Probe System (IDS/IPS):   initially thought as a extension of the IDS/IPS 
system provided by the devices that form the WiFi network, a number of WiFi  
devices running as a probe will  be deployed around CLC's dependencies,  
whenever the lightweight APs cannot be installed. They will detect rogue APs, 
unauthorized  access  (or  just  failed  attempts  to  gain  access)  to  the  WiFi  
networks. Those devices will use a Linux based firmware (i. e. DD-WRT) and 
several scripts developed to detect and to report those events. A server will be 
used for data collecting and to create an automated reporting system and a 
centralized management point for all of the probe devices.
• PKI:   a Public Key Infrastructure is required to deploy and manage per server 
and  per  user  certificates  to  authenticate  within  the  802.1x  infrastructure. 
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Additionally, this infrastructure will be used by the customer for other goals (i. 
e. messaging signature).
• IP CCTV System:   there are two different CCTV deployments, so each one will 
require different measures. So far, the most insecure is the system that links 
cams installed in the mine area, so it will require a physical change of those 
WiFi devices. By and large, modifications in the current configurations will be 
required too.
• WiFi Point-to-Point Bridge:   by and large, this is the most secure infrastructure. 
802.11i standard is already in use so only a few changes will be required in 
the configuration of the devices. This infrastructure is already included in the 
monitoring system.
• Telecontrol WiFi Network:   this critical infrastructure will require to deal with the 
Engineering company that  maintains this  infrastructure.  An initial  design to 
change the devices or to update the firmware will be proposed. The purpose 
is  to  reach  WPA2  (or  at  least  WPA)  protocol  for  communications 
confidentiality  and  802.1x  for  authentication.  This  design  will  include  the 
installation  of  a  local  RADIUS server  in that  network and monitoring of  all 
those devices.
• Configurations Backup System:   running as an automated system for collecting 
and storage of configurations of all the WiFi devices (whenever it is allowed 
such  as  in  the  Cisco  devices).  It  will  be  a  central  repository  for  those 
configurations. The task will be executed in an scheduled way to connect (i. e. 
via ssh) to the device and to obtain its configuration).
• Correlation and Log Management:   a centralized server will become the point 
where all the devices will storage their logs and events. Having all of them in a 
central point will allow to manage and audit them in a efficient way.
Additionally to this items, there are a set of measures that have not been showed in 
the previous picture but they make up the overall picture:
• To update firmware of some of the WiFi devices.
• To securize the configurations of some of the devices to protect items such as 
privileged/administrative passwords.
• To define a corporate ICT security policy in order to  prevent  the arrival  of 
vehicles  carrying  WiFi  devices  and  the  unauthorized  and/or  out-of-control 
installation of APs.
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3.2. Advantages of this solution
This subsection lists the main pros provided by this solution. They are enumerated 
from an overall  perspective,  so they are expected to  increase as a result  of  the 
detailed part of each module.
These are the advantages:
• Integration between each part of the design and with the already in use ICT 
infrastructure.
• Creation of  a security baseline so each WiFi  infrastructure has a common 
security by the use of specific technologies and protocols. It guarantees a high 
level of security by default.
• Confidentiality and non-repudation in communications.
• Prevention against identity spoofing and thieft in an 802.11 environment.
• Future  vision  to  allow scalability  and  integration  with  new technologies  in 
security and network management fields (i. e. PKI)
• Reuse of  available  WiFi  devices,  mostly  Cisco and D-Link  models.  Those 
equipments that do not reach a minimum security level have been isolated 
and will  be dealt  with their  supplier  in order to find  out  a solution (i.  e.  to 
update their firmware).
• User friendly system. The main part of the infrastructure will be transparent for  
the  end  user  and  whenever  user  interaction  is  required,  a  detailed  set  of  
instructions  will  be  provided  (i.  e.  the  web  interface  to  create  the  valid 
credentials to connect to the guest WiFi network). The perspective of the end 
user has been one of the subjects taken into consideration over the design of 
this solution.
• Reduction of the time of response in case of failure of a WiFi device.
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 61
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
4. Detailed solution
This  section  consists  on  a  detailed  explanation  of  each part  that  makes  up this 
approach.
It is important to mention that the main parts of this solution are the WiFi Network  
and the probe system. Therefore, they were showed to the customer and now they 
are pending of approval. If approved, a model will be created to show how they work.  
The rest of the solution is detailed in this section too, but not in such an exhaustive 
way.
The module corresponding to the Publick Key Infrastructure is a primary subject that 
requires additional data gathering in order to design a corporate infrastructure able to  
be  used  by  additional  systems  and  services  within  the  corporation.  However, 
depending on the result of the two already delivered parts, the PKI will be designed 
or not.
4.1. WiFi Network
The goal on this part of the project is to get that 7 working centres have access to a 
global WiFi network.
It has been designed using multiple APs and based on the use of Lightweight Access 
Points (LAPs) managed in a centralized way by a device known as Wireless LAN 
Controller (WLC). Throught this device it will flow either control data (among devices) 
or user data.
Next (table 6),  this is the distribution of  the APs, taking into consideration all  the 
available devices now (only Cisco equipments):
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This approach requires the use of 5 devices to connect the 7 working centres, as  
illustration 18 reflects.  Due to  the proximity between several  buildings, it  may be 
possible to use fewer.
This  approach  considers  the  use  of  the  protocols  LWAPP  and/or  CAPWAP  to 
manage the lightweight APs. It is important to mention that CAPWAP is already an 
standard so it is used by some vendors.
Already in use (and available) WiFi devices are running in autonomous mode, then it 
will be required to upgrade their Cisco IOS to a lightweight AP operational mode. All  
the  models  available  (Cisco Aironet  1242  and  1310  series)  in  CLC support  this  
upgrade.
As it can be appreciated, this design is scalable and it brings the opportunity to add 
new WiFi devices whenever it is necessary.
This solution uses several SSIDs to distinguish between different user profiles and 
several WLAN to create different network segments. Notice that the firewall (already 
in use) is a very important item within this design.
Corporate users
Illustration 19 shows the solution proposed for the corporate users profile.
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According to this solution, one possible SSID would be “CLC”.
To cipher communications, the procol used would be WPA2, whereas authentication 
would be based on an implementation of the 802.1x protocol. Therefore, user would 
have to validate his credentials against a RADIUS server, which would verify them in 
Active Directory database; it is, a collection of users (and other objects) allocated in 
the Domain Controllers belonging to the Windows 2003 domain. In that way, EAP 
based would be the proposed method, using digital certificates, so that mutual device 
and  user  authentication  would  be  granted.  However,  EAP  extension  must  be 
analyzed in a more extensive way in order to decide about the use of one of the 
multiple choices. By now, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and PEAP are the main candidates.
With this approach, communications are secured end to end and domain credentials 
are unique for each user and managed in a centralized way.
The deployment of this part of the project, based on the use of digital certificates at 
both ends, would require to design and to deploy a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
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According to this part of the solution, once the host is associated and authenticated 
(and authorized), the user will have access to the CLC's network and to Internet.
Visitors (guest and contractor user)
For this kind of users, the proposed infrastructure is a bit different to that used for the  
corporate users, so that RADIUS server would not validate user credentials against 
Active  Directory,  but  a  local  users  database.  Unlike  the  previous  part,  this 
infrastructure would not use digital certificates to verify identity of both entities, only 
the  server  part.  Compared with  the  previous one,  this  approach relaxes security 
levels,  but it  is enough taking into consideration the cost of  deploying certificates 
across visitors, that would be something inefficient.
This part of the solution relies on the use of 2 different SSIDs. The first one, called  
“WELCOME”,  would  have  entry  functions  and  no  security  at  layer  2.  Once 
associated, hosts would be allocated in an separated WLAN, totally undercontrol and 
without  access  to  the  LAN or  to  Internet.  Then,  opening  a  web  browser  would 
immediately redirect to a website to get a valid user and password. Some information 
would be required:
• Name and first name
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• ID card number / Passport
• Company
• e-mail address
• Name and first name of the responsible person in CLC
With this information:
1. Web Server would generate a valid user and password pair.
2. Gathered data (and credentials) would be passed from the web server to the 
RADIUS server through a secure connection (i. e. SSH).
3. The RADIUS server would verify several parts of the gathered information (i. 
e.  data  of  the  responsible  person in  CLC against  Active Directory).  Then, 
there are two options:
a) In case data is correct, RADIUS server would introduce gathered data (and 
user credentials) into its local database and it would notify the web server. 
Additionally, a notification e-mail would be sent to the responsible person 
and an e-mail with the new credentials and WiFi regulations would be sent 
to the visitor.
b) In case data is not correct, RADIUS server would notify the web server and 
the new credentials would not been shown to the visitor. Web server would 
notify the user about the error.
4. Once data is confirmed and the web server notified, the visitor would see the 
new credentials  displayed  on  the  screen  and  he  would  be  notified  about 
connecting to the guest's SSID (“Guest”).
It  is  important  to  mention  that  registering  website  would  use  SSL  (HTTPS),  the 
server would be securized and monitorized and the code audited in orther to prevent 
from  attacks  (i.  e.  SQL  injection).  Also,  each  register  attempt  to  create  valid 
credentials  would  be  registed  in  a  local  database  in  the  webserver  in  order  to 
maintain a list of requests.
Additionally, e-mails sent from the RADIUS server would use digital certificates to 
sign the e-mails. This measure would ensure sender authenticity and it would grant 
that nobody modifies the message. Ciphering to grant confidentiality has no sense 
because the e-mail  sent  to  the visitor's  responsible  does not  contain  confidential  
information and the public key of the visitor is not available to cipher the message.
In case of failure during the creation of new credentials it is suggested to inform IT 
staff.
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The third SSID (“Guest”) would belong to a WiFi network configured to use WPA2 
and 802.1x to  securize communications end to  end.  Like in  the  corporate  user's 
network, all actions done during the association phase would be registered.
Due to the fact that the secured “Guest” network would use temporal credentials, it 
would be necessary to define with the customer the duration.
Users connected  to  the  “Guest”  network would have only a  controlled access to 
Internet.
4.2. WiFi Probe System (IDS/IPS)
This infrastructure consists on a set of WiFi devices compatible with DD-WRT Linux 
distro. They would be allocated in strategic places to act as a probe to detect and  
prevent from intrussions. Apart from an specific firmware, these devices would have 
a  set  of  tools  (i.  e.  aircrack-ng  suite)  and  scripts  developed  to  detect  strange 
behaviours on the wireless network in several  security related aspects.  This  is a 
sample of some of the issues that could be detected:
• Rogue APs used to obtain information from users.
• Non allowed devices running as APs installed for multiple purposes that could 
interfere with other wireless infrastructures.
• Client stations associated with a non allowed AP. It would involve a security 
breach.
This  approach  considers  the  deployment  of  10  sensor  devices  around  CLC's 
facilities  (as  shown  in  illustration  21).  Nonetheless,  once  installed  it  could  be 
necessary to move or to add a probe to improve the system performance.
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Illustration 21. Distribution of the 10 probe devices
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
With regard to the state and the alerts monitoring, it would integrate with the system 
already in use, called Icinga. However, it is suggested the installation of a dedicated 
server  to  storage  data  collected  by  these  WiFi  probes,  so  that  an  audit  and/or 
analysis could be done whenever it is necessary. It would allow to detect anomalous 
behaviours. Illustration 22 shows the idea.
Integration between the WiFi Network and the Probe System
As previously stated, the devices that make up the infrastructure of Cisco ligthweight 
APs  and  WLC  have  security  capabilities  (i.  e.  Management  Frame  Protection).  
Therefore,  the initial  approach considers the probes as an extension of  the WiFi 
network  that  would  allow  Cisco  devices  to  widen  detection  and  prevention 
capabilities to places where those devices have no WiFi range and, consequently, 
their security features have no effect.
The result of the deployment of the 15 devices is shown in the illustration 23.
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With  regard to  the  management  and monitoring of  both  systems,  they would be 
unified  in  an  unique  point,  it  is,  the  Icinga  server.  The  Cisco WLC  has  its  own 
monitoring possibilities, but it can join the current monitoring infrastructure by the use 
of SNMP. As a consequence, using Icinga as a central point, it would allow to create 
several maps with the precise position of those devices and their state. Therefore, it  
would be possible to obtain an overall picture and easily detect any failure or alarm 
and the location of the affected device. Look at illustration 24 for a sample of this 
integration.
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4.3. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
According to the design of the solution, digital  certificates are required in several 
parts, so a corporate certificate authority seems to be a must in CLC. Furthermore to 
the use of certificates for WiFi authentication purposes and thinking on future uses.
In this case, more information needs to be obtained in conjunction with the customer 
so that a proper infrastructure can be assessed and designed. This part (the PKI) is 
considered  non  futile  and  now we are  not  ready  to  offer  a  valid  design  of  the 
infrastructure, therefore, just a few considerations are given about it. 
In fact,  the main issue is not just to install  a CA integrated with Active Directory,  
because Microsoft Windows offers many guidelines to help on the creation of a CA in 
a “next...  next” basis. The most important is to define the infrastructure itself  and 
whether it will be really accepted by the users to save time and money. Some of the 
topics to think about would be:
• Technical requirements such as the authorities (the certificate,  the registry, 
the validation and the timestamp) and the PKI products already available.
• Staff requirements such as the security responsible and the manager of the 
infrastructure.
• Procedural requirements such as the security procedures and the policies.
Carlos Jiménez Barranco 71
Illustration 24. Integration of both infrastructures into Icinga
Analysis & Design of a secure WLAN solution for CLC
Additional subjects to have into account are CA's management model and type of  
acknowledgement  required;  so  that  the  CA can  be  independent  or  based  on  a 
certificate from a root CA (i. e. Verisign), or managed by the IT crew or by another 
dedicated company (a hosted service).
4.4. IP CCTV System
As previously stated, there are currently two different infrastructures: one for the IP 
cams located in the access control to several parts of CLC and another for the IP 
cams in the mine area.
This part of the solution has not been analyzed in deep yet, but the main idea would 
be to deal with each system in a separated way because the current situation of  
each one is different from the other. However, both would reach equivalent security 
levels.
On  illustration  25  it  is  displayed  the  location  of  the  devices  that  make  up  each 
system.
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IP CCTV system for the access control
By now, this is one of the most up to date and secured WiFi infrastructures. It is  
formed by two autonomous AP (client mode) that connect IP cams to a third AP 
acting as the hub (or main) AP. They implement WPA2 and a local RADIUS server in  
the main AP to authenticate the other ends.
The solution would involve to integrate this solution with the LAPs – WLC topology 
proposed for the WiFi Network part, due to the fact that the three APs that form this 
system are Cisco models that support the lightweight operational mode. In fact, only 
the main AP would be updated to the new operational mode, while the other two AP 
would continue running as WiFi stations associated to the main one.
WPA2 would be used too and the RADIUS Server would be moved to a centralized 
one. Also, MFP would be enabled to take advantage of the security mechanisms of 
these devices.
This infrastructure would be used in a WLAN separated from those used for another 
infrastructures (i. e. WiFi Network). As a result, centralized security and management 
are granted.
IP CCTV system for the IP cams in la Corta
As shown in the Illustration, this system is formed by 3 IP cams connected each one 
to  a  WiFi  device  that  is  associated  with  a  main  AP  at  the  headquarters. 
Unfortunately, this system has frequent techical problems and its solution requires an 
in depth analysis.
Based on the analysis done up to now, it is thought that the main AP is not the most 
convenient  for  this  infrastructure  because it  cannot  receive signal  from the  other 
ends with good power levels. One option would be to buy new Cisco APs, but a initial 
approach will be to reuse an available D-Link device with three independent radio 
interfaces. Each interface would have a directional antenna pointing to the other end.
As  it  was  done  with  the  other  IP  CCTV  system,  WPA2  and  802.1x  would  be 
implemented to secure communications.  In this case, it  would not be possible to 
integrate  in  the  LAPs  –  WLC  topology,  but  it  would  use  the  previous  installed 
RADIUS server for a centralized management of the AAA protocol.
This system would be fully integrated with Icinga for monitoring tasks.
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4.5. WiFi Point-to-Point Bridge
This infrastructure uses WPA2 and 802.1x to enforce communications security. In 
fact, it is quite similar to the implementation previously explained in the IP CCTV 
system for the access control, except that these devices are working in bridge mode 
while CCTV's APs work in AP and station/client mode. Therefore, a first approach 
would  be  quite  similar  to  that.  It  would  consider  the  upgrade  of  the  APs  to  a 
lightweight operational mode in order to add them to the Wireless LAN Controller 
and  to  separate  each  bridge  by  the  use  of  different  WLANs.  802.1x  would  be 
implemented by using the centralized RADIUS server.
4.6. Telecontrol WiFi Network
Nowadays, this is an independent network so it will require to decide whether it must 
continue being an independent infrastructure. There are chances that it will continue 
working  autonomously;  therefore,  the  solution  would  be  focused  on  increasing 
security levels.
There are 6 devices that form the WiFi part of this infrastructure but as shown in the 
WiFi  assessment,  they  contain  a  very  outdated  and  plenty  of  flaws  firmware. 
Additionally, configuration contains several by default values that should be modified.
Consequently, the first action would be to upgrade the firmware. Then, to install a 
RADIUS server in that network and to configure each pair to use WPA2 and 802.1x 
(via that previously configured RADIUS server).
With regard to monitoring tasks, one option would be to install an additional server 
with Icinga only for people in charge of managing that infrastructure. Therefore, it 
would allow to monitorize wired and wireless network devices.
For IDS/IPS capabilities, it would be used the probe devices deployed in that area 
(as it was shown in the subsection “4.2. WiFi Probe System”). These devices belong 
to another network.
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4.7. Configurations Backup System
This part of the solution is intended to offer a central repository where to safely pick 
up and storage the configurations of all the WiFi devices. However, the final goal is 
to extend this feature to all the wired and wireless network devices.
It would be enough with a virtual machine (with a Linux operating system) able to  
connect to each network device to download its configuration and to storage it in a 
folder  structure  pending  of  definition  with  the  customer.  A  procedure  would  be 
decided  to  name  each  configuration  file.  The  task  would be  executed  in  an 
scheduled way to connect (i. e. via ssh) to the device and to obtain its configuration.
This computer would be included into the corporate backup infrastructure. It is used 
Symantec Backup Exec, then a client program would be installed in this server to 
remotely backup the stored configuration files in an scheduled basis.
Eventually, this server would be added to Icinga for monitoring tasks.
4.8. Correlation and Log Management
Similar  to  the  previous  system  of  configurations  backup,  the  idea  is  to  have  a 
centralized server (i. e. a virtualized one) to become the centralized point where all 
the devices would storage their logs and events. To accomplish it, all the network 
devices (wireless and even wired too) should be configured to output their events to 
an  external  host  (traditionally  it  is  used UDP port  514)  and the  syslogd (on  the 
server) should be configured to accept remote logs. The protocol used would be the 
BSD syslog Protocol.
In this way, having all of them in a central point will allow to manage and audit them 
in a efficient way.
This machine would be added to Icinga for monitoring tasks.
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Conclusions
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The aim of this chapter is to be a section where to describe the conclusions of this  
TFC, but from a more personal perspective.
Initially, this project was a daunting adventure, full of new experiences, many tricky 
concepts  and the  use of  English  as  the  language to  write  it.  Also,  moving to  a 
different  city  and  working  in  a  new company  at  the  same  time  I  studied  some 
pending subjects sound very exhausting, but it was exciting even.
In fact, in Sevilla there were good personal reasons to live and the idea of this project 
for the TFC appealed to me. Additionally, I tend to think that this kind of opportunities 
only happen once at life. So I decided to accept this adventure.
Eventually, after some months of hard work and a positive thought, the course is 
almost  finished  and  I  have  learned  many  technical  and  management  related 
concepts. In fact, I must admit that security algorithms is a new subject (for me) to 
which I would like to invest more time to go into this topic in depth. Also, as far as I  
am concerned, this project is now even more ambitious than initially and, by and 
large, I  think it can solve many of the problems detected in CLC and to improve 
several of its infrastructures. 
Now, I certainly think that it has been a very gratifying experience. Moreover, several 
goals on this project have been already achieved and there are chances to continue 
after the schoolarship gets over to implement the full project. So, anything else?
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Glossary
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802.11i Security standard
It  is  an  amendment  to  the  original  IEEE  802.11.  The  draft  standard  was 
ratified  on 24 June 2004.  This  standard specifies  security mechanisms for 
wireless networks. It replaced the short Authentication and privacy clause of 
the  original  standard  with  a  detailed  Security  clause.  In  the  process  it 
deprecated the broken WEP. The amendment was later incorporated into the 
published IEEE 802.11-2007 standard.
IEEE  802.11i  provides  a  Robust  Security  Network  (RSN)  with  two  new 
protocols,  the  4-Way  Handshake  and  the  Group  Key  Handshake.  These 
utilize the authentication services and port access control described in IEEE 
802.1X to establish and change the appropriate cryptographic keys. The RSN 
is a security network that only allows the creation of robust security network 
associations  (RSNAs),  which  are  a  type  of  association  used  by  a  pair  of 
stations  (STAs)  if  the  procedure  to  establish  authentication  or  association 
between them includes the  4-Way Handshake.  It  also provides two RSNA 
data  confidentiality  and  integrity  protocols,  TKIP  and  CCMP,  with 
implementation of CCMP being mandatory.
It  supresses weaknesses of  previous standards in  user  authentication  and 
ciphering methods. It increases security in WLAN enviroments and it reduces 
complexity and roaming time of users from one access point to the other.
802.1x protocol
It is an standard mainly designed to offer authentication mechanisms to users 
on  layer  2  (media  access)  in  switched  networks.  Moreover,  in  wireless 
networks it uses dynamic keys for the association between a client station and 
the access point.
It brings confidentiality on media access (layer 2) because it creates a point to 
point  connexion and prevents access on that  port  if  authentication  fails.  It 
allows an strong authentication between a client and the access point.
AAA
In  computer  security,  it  stands  for  authentication,  authorization  and 
accounting:
Authentication refers to the process where an entity's identity is authenticated, 
typically by providing evidence that it holds a specific digital identity such as 
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an  identifier  and  the  corresponding  credentials.  Examples  of  types  of 
credentials are passwords, one-time tokens and digital certificates.
The authorization function determines whether a particular entity is authorized 
to perform a given activity, typically inherited from authentication when logging 
on to an application or service. Authorization may be determined based on a 
range of restrictions, for example time-of-day restrictions, or physical location 
restrictions, or restrictions against multiple access by the same entity or user. 
Typical authorizations in everyday computer life is for example granting read 
access to a specific file for authenticated user. Examples of types of service 
include, but are not limited to: IP address filtering, address assignment, route 
assignment,  Quality  of  Service/differential  services,  bandwidth  control/traffic 
management, compulsory tunneling to a specific endpoint and encryption.
Accounting refers to the tracking of network resource consumption by users 
for  the  purpose  of  capacity  and  trend  analysis,  cost  allocation,  billing.  In 
addition,  it  may  record  events  such  as  authentication  and  authorization 
failures,  and  include  auditing  functionality,  which  permits  verifying  the 
correctness of procedures carried out based on accounting data. Real-time 
accounting refers to accounting information that is delivered concurrently with 
the  consumption  of  the  resources.  Batch  accounting  refers  to  accounting 
information that is saved until it is delivered at a later time. Typical information 
that is gathered in accounting is the identity of the user or other entity, the 
nature of the service delivered, when the service began, and when it ended, 
and if there is a status to report.
ARP poisoning
This technique consists of sending lots of ARP packets to a host in order to 
change a real MAC mapping with a different one, usually false, to take over 
the flow of traffic from/to that host (the host of the real MAC changed).
ARP spoofing
It consists of changing the MAC address of a computer to act as a different 
host.
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Banner grabbing
Technique to  get knowledge about  running services from the banner  once 
connection with the remote host is established.
Different WiFi areas for users and guests
It is a segmentation of a WLAN network using different SSID's. It allows to 
differentiate traffic from different hosts according to parameters like being a 
guest or a computer from within the CLC's network.
Once users have validated their credentials, they can gain full access to data 
and services in CLC's network; whereas the guests,  allocated in an under 
control  and  monitorized  WLAN,  will  access  only  Internet.  This  brings  the 
advantage of safely isolate computers and users groups.
EAP
It is an authentication framework, not a specific authentication mechanism. It 
provides some common functions and negotiation of authentication methods 
called EAP methods. There are currently about 40 different methods defined. 
Methods  defined  in  IETF  RFCs  include  EAP-MD5,  EAP-OTP,  EAP-GTC, 
EAP-TLS, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA, and in addition a 
number of vendor specific methods and new proposals exist. Commonly used 
modern methods capable of operating in wireless networks include EAP-TLS, 
EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, LEAP and EAP-TTLS.
Icinga
It is an enterprise grade Open Source monitoring system which keeps watch 
over  networks  and  any conceivable  network  resource,  notifies  the  user  of  
errors and recoveries and generates performance data for reporting.
It is scalable and extensible and it can monitor complex, large environments 
across dispersed locations. Also, it is Open Source and it has an API based 
extensible  architecture.  It  offers  a  dynamic  web  interface  and  supports  a 
distributed system for redundant monitoring.
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Intrusion and rogue AP detection systems
They are a set of hardware and/or software installed in strategic positions in 
the  network  to  log  events  like  failed/sucessful  not  permitted  attempts  of 
gainning access into the system, malicious traffic,  a critical  item within the 
network infrastructure suffering an attack, etc. Event logging allows to act in a 
preventive  way  and/or  to  respond  actively  to  avoid  other  devices  can  be 
affected (i. e. with DoS attacs).
It  is easily integrable with the current customer's network infrastructure and 
once it  is parametrized it  gives a large amount of  information on real time 
about malicious actions, within a LAN and from Internet.
Maintenance of these devices is minimal and it considerably improves security 
levels and the control of the network infrastructure.
Man in The Middle
This technique has been used in conjunction with the arp spoofing technique 
to  put  an attacker  computer  between two target  hosts,  so that  data  traffic 
between those computers can be redirected through the attacker computer.
Management Frame Protection (MFP)
When management frame protection is enabled, AP adds message integrity 
check information element (MIC IE) to each management frame it transmits. 
Any attempt to copy, alter, or replay the frame invalidates the MIC. An AP, 
which is configured to validate MFP frames receives a frame with invalid MIC, 
reports it to the WLC.
Client MFP shields authenticated clients from spoofed frames, which prevents 
the effectiveness of many of the common attacks against wireless LANs. Most 
attacks,  such  as  deauthentication  attacks,  revert  to  simply  degraded 
performance when they contend with valid clients.
Packet sniffing
configuring NIC in promiscuous mode it can receive all packets on the WiFi 
frequency, regardless their destination.
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Port Scanning
The act of systematically scanning a computer's ports. Since a port is a place 
where information goes into and out of a computer, port scanning identifies 
open doors to a computer.  Port scanning has legitimate uses in managing 
networks, but port  scanning also can be malicious in nature if  someone is 
looking for a weakened access point to break into your computer. 
Plublic Key Infrastructure (PKI)
It is a set of hardware and software, policies and security procedures to do 
criptographic  operations  safely  (i.  e.  cipher,  digital  signature  and  non 
repudiation  of  electronical  transactions).  It  also  refers  to  the  certification 
authority and to other components in electronical communications. Combined 
with  802.1x  and  802.11i  standards  it  allows  to  authenticate  users  and 
systems, to cipher data and to secure communications. In the same way, the 
use  of  digital  certificates  is  an  item  that  can  be  extended  to  messaging 
solutions (i. e. Microsoft Exchange) and fully integrated with Active Directory. 
It allows sender identification, digital signature and non repudation warranty 
(someone  will  be  unable  to  deny  at  a  later  date  that  they  have  signed 
something).
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-in User Server)
It is an AAA protocol (authentication, autorization and accounting) for network 
access or IP mobility services. On the other hand, it also refers to a server 
used to check whether that authentication/autorization information is correct. If  
credentials are valid, RADIUS server will authorize network access and it will 
deploy network resources (i.  e.  IP address).  It  logs events too.  It  validates 
credentials of computers attempting to connect to the wireless network. Also, 
it offers Active Directory integration capabilities. It  logs and alerts of events 
like session log in/out,  total  transferred paquets,  volume of trasferred data, 
reason of the session log out, etc.
SCADA
IT stands for supervisory control  and data acquisition. It  generally refers to 
industrial  control  systems:  computer  systems  that  monitor  and  control 
industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based processes, as described below:
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◦ Industrial  processes  include  those  of  manufacturing,  production,  power 
generation,  fabrication,  and refining,  and may run in  continuous,  batch, 
repetitive, or discrete modes. 
◦ Infrastructure  processes  may  be  public  or  private,  and  include  water 
treatment  and distribution,  wastewater  collection  and  treatment,  oil  and 
gas pipelines, electrical power transmission and distribution, Wind farms, 
civil defense siren systems, and large communication systems. 
◦ Facility processes occur both in public facilities and private ones, including 
buildings,  airports,  ships,  and space stations.  They monitor  and control 
HVAC, access, and energy consumption. 
Service Set Identifier (SSID)
A service set identifier  (SSID) is a name that  identifies a particular 802.11 
wireless LAN. A client device receives broadcast messages from all access 
points within range advertising their SSIDs. The client device can then either 
manually or  automatically (based on configuration)  select  the  network with 
which to associate. The SSID can be up to 32 characters long. As the SSID 
displays  to  users,  it  normally  consists  of  human-readable  characters. 
However,  the  standard  does  not  require  this.  The  SSID  is  defined  as  a 
sequence of 2–32 octets each of which may take any value.
It  is  legitimate  for  multiple  access  points  to  share  the  same  SSID  if  they 
provide access to the same network as part of an extended service set.
Some wireless access points support broadcasting multiple SSIDs, allowing 
the creation of virtual access points, partitioning a single physical access point 
into several virtual access points, each of which can have a different set of 
security and network settings. This is not yet part of the 802.11 standard.
Social Engineering
This technique consists on obtaining or attempting to obtain otherwise secure 
data  by  conning  an  individual  into  revealing  secure  information.  Social 
engineering  is  successful  because  its  victims  innately  want  to  trust  other 
people and are naturally helpful. The victims of social engineering are tricked 
into  releasing information  that  they do not  realize will  be used to  attack  a 
computer network.
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Wireless LAN Controller (WLC)
This  device is used in  combination  with  Lightweight  Access Point  Protocol 
(LWAPP) to  manage  light  weight  access  points  in  large  quantities  by  the 
network administrator or NOC. The Wireless LAN controller is part of the Data 
Plane within the Cisco Wireless Model.  The WLAN controller  automatically 
handles the configuration of anywhere from 6 to 500 wireless access-points, 
depending on the model.
Wireless packet analysis hardware/software
It is a computer program or a piece of computer hardware that can intercept 
and log traffic passing over a digital  wireless network or part of  a wireless 
network.  As  data  streams  flow  across  the  wireless  network,  the  sniffer 
captures  each  packet  and,  if  needed,  decodes  and  analyzes  its  content 
according to the appropriate RFC or other specifications.
WPA2
It is a security protocol and security certification program developed by the Wi-
Fi Alliance to secure wireless computer networks. The Alliance defined this in 
response  to  serious  weaknesses  researchers  had  found  in  the  previous 
system,  WEP  (Wired  Equivalent  Privacy).  WPA2  has  replaced  WPA.  It 
implements the mandatory elements of 802.11i.
WPA2 provides support for all of the mechanisms available in WPA, as well 
as strong encryption and authentication support for infrastructure and ad-hoc 
networks.  It  reduces  overhead  in  key  derivation  during  the  wireless  LAN 
authentication exchange. Also, it supports opportunistic key caching to reduce 
the  overhead  in  roaming  between  access  points,  as  well  as,  pre-
authentication,  where  a  station  completes  the  IEEE  802.1X  authentication 
exchange  before  roaming.  Overmore,  it  supports  the  CCMP  encryption 
mechanism based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher as an 
alternative to the TKIP protocol.
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This section lists the additional references (URLs, books, etc.) used within the TFC. 
Next, these are the most relevant:
Technical Specifications of the main WiFi devices
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/wireless/ps5678/ps6521/product_
data_sheet0900aecd8031c844.html
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/wireless/ps5679/ps5861/product_
data_sheet09186a00802252e1.html
• http://www.dlink.es/cs/Satellite?c=Product_C&childpagename=DLinkEurope-
ES
%2FDLProductCarouselMultiple&cid=1197375189986&p=1197357768092&p
ackedargs=locale%3D1195806681347&pagename=DLinkEurope-ES
%2FDLWrapper
• Moxa AirWorks  AWK-1100  User's  Manual  (First  Edition)  → http://www.bb-
elec.com/bb-elec/literature/manuals/AWK-1100_UM_1eman.pdf
• Ubiquiti NS2 Datasheet → http://www.ubnt.com/downloads/ns2_datasheet.pdf
WEP Privacy
• http://www.configurarequipos.com/doc527.html
General information about modern WLANs
• http://www.perihel.at/wlan/wlanfacts.html
• http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/DBm
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_set_%28802.11_network%29
WiFi Security assessment
• http://www.redeszone.net/seguridad-informatica/hackear-una-red-wifi-sin-
clientes-conectados-aprende-a-hackear-una-red-wifi-sin-clientes-mediante-el-
ataque-chop-chop/
• http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=es:packetforge-ng
• http://www.ifm.net.nz/cookbooks/passwordcracker.html
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• http://www.tech-faq.com/decrypt-cisco-passwords.html
• http://books.google.es/books?
id=4OszUcvlWrUC&pg=PA194&lpg=PA194&dq=open-
wrt+rogue+ap&source=bl&ots=kVCk0TYq81&sig=O-
2FFrTbKv4BGM5YpWDlVomj53M&hl=es&ei=FP_QTba7F4OzhAfdybDyDA&s
a=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEgQ6AEwBA#v=onepage
&q=rogue&f=false
• http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=472323
• http://www.taringa.net/posts/info/8900842/Querias-localizar-senales-wifi_-
Mira_.html
• http://bulma.net/body.phtml?nIdNoticia=2015
• http://geek00l.blogspot.com/2007/01/offline-pcap-analysis.html
• http://seguridadyredes.wordpress.com/2008/04/30/tshark-wireshark-en-linea-
de-comandos-i-parte/
• http://www.aircrack-ng.org/
802.1x and EAP
• http://www.manual-wifi.com/802.1x.html
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extensible_Authentication_Protocol
• http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-03/bh-win-03-riley-
wireless/bh-win-03-riley.pdf
802.11i
• http://www.networkworld.es/Seguridad-WLAN-802.11i-_Pros-y-
contras/seccion-/articulo-169579
Wireless Distribution System (WDS)
• http://www.smallnetbuilder.com/wireless/wireless-howto/31191-everything-
you-need-to-know-about-wireless-bridging-and-repeating-part-1-wds
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Cisco Wireless Routers configuration
• https://help.ubuntu.com/community/CiscoConsole
• http://docstore.mik.ua/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/access/mar_3200/wlsnotes/c
fpwrdat.htm
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a00809d
38a7.shtml
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller (WLC)
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6366/products_qanda_item09186a00
8064a991.shtml
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/wireless/ps6302/ps8322/ps11630/
data_sheet_c78-645111.html
• Cisco  Wireless  LAN  Controller  Configuration  Guide,  Release  7.0 
(http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/wireless/controller/7.0/configuration/guide/c
70cg.pdf)
• IRC channel #cisco at irc.ubuntu.com:8001
Security in a WLC and LAP topology
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk722/tk809/technologies_configuration_exa
mple09186a008080dc8c.shtml
Cisco CleanAir Technology
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns1070/index.html
Upgrading Autonomous Cisco Aironet Access Points to Lightweight Mode
• http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/wireless/access_point/conversion/lwapp/up
grade/guide/lwapnote.html#wp161111
Open Source LAN Controllers
• http://www.chillispot.info/features.html
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LWAPP and CAPWAP
• http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/capwap/charter/
• http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/LWAPP
• https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/thread/6856
Public Key Infrastructure
• http://www.networkworld.es/Paso-a-paso_PKI-y-certificados-digitales/seccion-
seguridad/articulo-134356
• http://web.ipsca.com/en/Products_PKI
• http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infraestructura_de_clave_p%C3%BAblica
• http://digi-sign.com/es/es/digi-ca/tipos%20autoridad%20certificadora
Remote Syslogs
• http://www.vicente-navarro.com/blog/2007/12/08/configurar-el-syslogd-para-
que-acepte-mensajes-de-sistemas-remotos/
• http://www.debuntu.org/how-to-remote-syslog-logging-debian-and-ubuntu
Dictionaries
• Wordreference (online dictionnary) → www.wordreference.com
• Cambridge  Advanced  Learner's  Dictionary  (Third  Edition,  Cambridge 
University Press)
• Webopedia (online dictionary for words and sentences related to computer 
and Internet tecnology) → www.webopedia.com
• Wikipedia (online encyclopedia) → http://en.wikipedia.org
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